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Abstract 
This paper examines the relationship between asset managers‟ nationality and the Italian 
occupational pension funds extending the existing literature on the topic. We use a double 
analysis methodology, targeted at single- and multiple-managers, distinguishing between 
Italian and/or foreign professional managers. The results obtained show how asset manager‟s 
nationality impacts differently on managed pension funds‟ performance according to the 
different investment line risk level, opening debate on asset managers‟ management skills. 
JEL: G02 - G00 - G11 
Keywords: Pension funds; Single-manager; Multiple-manager; Nationality bias; Pension 
funds performance 
1. Introduction 
The picture portrayed by the 2015 edition on data for 2014 of the annual report published by 
the OECD “Pension markets in focus”, reveals that pension funds are still the main financing 
vehicle for private pension plans, with USD 25.2 trillion of assets under management (AUM), 
representing 66.8% of total private pension assets in the OECD. The survey shows that 
sixteen of the thirty-six OECD countries have assets-to-GDP ratios of more than 20%, the 
minimum level for meeting the OECD‟s definition of a “mature” pension fund market. Italy, 
in contrast, has a ratio equal to 6.7%, and is twenty-eighth out of the thirty-six OECD 
countries.  
In Italy, on January 2007 the Government introduced an important and wide-ranging reform 
of the pension system, designed primarily with employees in mind and having the aim of 
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increasing and developing the supplementary pension scheme. According to the reform, each 
Italian occupational pension fund presents its investors with a choice of various investment 
lines, from a minimum of two to a maximum of five, with different levels of risk, from 
no-risk (also called „guaranteed line‟) to higher risk. In accordance with Pension Funds 
Supervision Commission (COVIP) guidelines, the „guaranteed line‟ is the investment line 
without any risk, i.e. the expected loss by members is zero; the „very low risk line‟ is the 
investment line for which the expected annual loss by its members is maximum 10%; the 
„low risk line‟ considers the possibility of a maximum 30% expected loss per year; „balanced‟ 
is the investment line for which the expected loss by its members is (maximum) from 30% to 
50%; „growth‟ is the investment line for which the expected loss could be even higher than 
50% per year. We identify investment line types from 1 (guaranteed line: no risk) to 5 (very 
high risk investment line: growth).   
The money collected in each investment line is managed by professional managers, Italian 
and/or foreign, single or multiple, through various legally-regulated bodies, by means of 
management agreements. When occupational pension funds are managed by more than one 
manager, each manager receives a mandate to manage a part of the assets collected but they 
are independent of each other in the choices they make and are not competing against each 
other. This behaviour is called coacting. The distinction between coacting and noncoacting 
was indicated in the discovery of social facilitation effects (Zanjonc, 1965). Zanjonc (1965) 
defines coacting effects as when “we observe individuals all simultaneously engaged in the 
same activity and in full view of each other” (p. 270).  
Figure 1 shows an example of Italian occupational pension fund structure, distinguishing the 
various investment lines established by the fund‟s statute, and the number, the name and the 
percentage of assets under management (AUM) assigned to each asset manager. As the figure 
1 shows, Italian occupational pension funds may employ a single fund manager for each 
investment line, with a „balanced mandate‟ across all asset classes, or multiple-managers, 
each with a „specialist mandate‟ within each asset class. The practice of using multiple 
managers, referred to by Sharpe (1981) as „decentralized investment management‟, presents 
many potential benefits, especially as funds grow larger (Sharpe, 1981). For example, 
pension funds can use multiple managers to diversify skills of specialist active managers 
having superior knowledge of a particular asset class (Sharpe, 1981), potentially achieving 
better performance.  
The managers running an Italian occupational pension fund may be Italians or foreign. 
Management studies have considered the impact of nationality on the performance of 
multinational groups (Brass, 1991) but there is no research on the relationship between asset 
manager nationality and mutual fund or pension fund performance. This paper investigates 
whether asset manager nationality affects Italian occupational pension fund performance, 
distinguishing between single-manager and multiple-managers. To this purpose, for each 
asset manager included in the sample, we gather the annual Jensen‟s alpha (Jensen, 1967, 
henceforth „alpha‟) as calculated by Morningstar. According to Morningstar glossary 
(www.morningstar.com) alpha „can be used to directly measure the value added or subtracted 
by a fund‟s manager.‟ However, Morningstar „calculates a fund‟s alpha, beta and R-squared 
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statistic by running least-squared regression of the fund excess return over a risk-free rate 
compared with the excess returns of the index that Morningstar has selected as the index for 
the fund‟s broad asset class or the fund‟s category index. Morningstar‟s editorial team 
assigns the category index.‟ Bearing in mind that the Morningstar methodology does not use 
the benchmark pension fund‟s prospectus performance, our regression analysis considers it. 
Moreover, in our analysis, alpha is weighted for the weight of each asset manager engaged in 
each investment line (e.g. 100% in the case of single-manager). 
 
Figure 1. Italian occupational pension fund structure: an example 
Source: figure created by the author 
The results obtained have several implications. First, the paper expands the inadequate 
existing literature on pension fund performance, considering a non-mature pension fund 
market (Italy) which has not been adequately explored in the literature, but which may offer 
many developing opportunities to asset managers. Second, it makes a new contribution to the 
topic and should open new debate on asset manager „nationality bias‟ (Eshghi, 1985).  Third, 
the results obtained could be taken in consideration by investors and practitioners in funds 
selection choice. 
Section 2 presents a literature review on the relationship between multiple-managers, 
decentralized investment management, „nationality bias‟ and performance. Section 3 
introduces the database and the variables used in the analysis and then Section 3 presents the 
main results obtained. Section 4 concludes. The Appendix presents a robustness check. 
2. Literature Review 
Many studies across management and psychology literature have examined performance 
differences between single- and multiple-managed funds (e.g. Sharpe, 1981; Prather and 
Middleton, 2002; Chen et al., 2004). In the context of portofolio management, Sharpe (1981) 
identifies some advantages of teams, including their ability to diversify style and judgement; 
on the same topic Hill (1982) and Herrenkohl (2004) also identify a broader range of 
specialized skills, knowledge and abilities available to a team for processing larger amounts 
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of information. Disadvantages include the presence of free riders (Holmstrom, 1982; 
Rasmusen, 1987) and delays in decision making (Sah and Stiglitz, 1988). Prather and 
Middleton (2002) find that there is no difference in the performances of team-managed funds 
and single-manager funds. Chen et al. (2004) regress future alpha (which expresses the stock 
selection abilities of fund managers (Jensen, 1967)) on a number of variables, including size 
and past returns. They find a negative relationship between alpha and size and a positive 
relationship with past returns. Thus, on average, they find future alpha is smaller for large 
funds but past returns are associated with higher future alpha, and predictability exists. 
Stock (2004), after reviewing more than 100 studies on team behaviour in a variety of 
circumstances, finds that teams behave differently from individuals but that these differences 
do not necessarily translate into a superior performance, no matter how they are measured. 
Bliss et al. (2008), using a sample of about 3,000 equity mutual funds over a 12-year 
timespan, find that although the number of funds managed by teams has grown at seven times 
the rate of funds managed by a single manager, no significant difference in risk-adjusted 
performance is observed between team-managed and individually-managed funds. Bar et al. 
(2011), considering a sample of U.S. equity mutual funds, find that teams take less extreme 
decisions than singles. Bogan et al. (2013) investigate whether the gender composition of 
fund management team influences investment decision making behavior. They demonstrate 
that a male presence increase the probability of selecting a higher risk investment.  
According to Sharpe (1981), especially large funds use multiple managers. Berk and Green 
(2004), highlight that when funds increase in size, excess return will disappear due to the 
resulting diseconomies of scale such as greater transaction costs and organizational 
diseconomies. Pollet and Wilson (2008) examine influences that could lead to diseconomies 
of scale. They hypothesize that management could put more money into existing stocks, 
therefore incurring higher transaction costs, or could increase the number of stocks in the 
portfolio, thereby having to select securities with lower expected returns. They show that 
management reacts overwhelmingly to an increase in size by increasing their ownership share 
in stocks already held in the portfolio rather than by increasing the number of investments: a 
doubling of fund size increases the number of stocks in the fund by less than 10%. Since 
management does not react to increasing size by adding a large number of new investments, 
if performance deteriorates with size it has to be due to increased transaction costs due to a 
larger position in the securities they hold or organizational diseconomies. 
Van Binsbergen et al. (2008) highlight the fact that a decentralized investment management 
process can generate several misalignments of incentives between the centralized decision 
maker of the firm (for example the Chief Investment Officer) and the asset manager 
specialized in a single asset class. They show that designing appropriate return benchmarks 
can substantially reduce these misalignments. 
Studies related to „decentralized investment management‟ and pension fund systems are 
lacking in the literature. On this topic, Blake et al. (2013) exame the U.K. pension fund 
industry from 1984 to 2004. Over this time period, most pension fund sponsors shifted from a 
single-manager (typically „balanced‟) to competing multiple-managers within each asset class. 
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They find evidence consistent with competition between multiple-managers producing better 
performance, and the total pension fund risk is lower under decentralized investment 
management. Although our study is on the same topic, it can be considered an original 
analysis because of some specific characteristics of Italian pension fund schemes. First, as 
indicated above, in the case of multiple-managers, the managers employed to manage the 
asset collected in each investment line are not in competition with each other but rather coact. 
Second, the global performance and the total risk for each occupational pension fund is not 
calculated. In fact, as shown in Figure 1, the occupational pension fund is a cap over different 
investment lines which are separate and  independent of each other.  
The relationship between nationality and performance has received less attention in the 
literature. Nationality is open to various definitions. It could refer to one‟s legal status, the 
identities of one‟s parents, the place of one‟s upbringing, and so on (Brass, 1991). Nationality 
may determine an individual‟s characteristics, influencing relationships with other people and 
team members (e.g. in terms of upbringing, religion, education, etc.) (Church, 1982). 
Eshghi‟s (1985) study established the „nationality bias‟, which can affect the performance of 
a multinational corporation.  According to the author it seems that cultural differences and 
diversified approaches create a situation where some bias in performance appraisal may exist. 
Pope and Pope (2015) consider player match data from 12 seasons of the UEFA champions 
league and referee assignment policies. In the case of player and referee from the same 
country, the authors demonstrate the existance of own-nationality bias: players officiated by a 
referee from the same country receive a 10% increase in beneficial foul calls. In the field of 
management decision-making, Lord and Foti (1986) discuss how nationality affects one‟s 
cognitive schema, such as knowledge of facts, events and trends, knowledge about 
alternatives, and knowledge or assumptions about how consequences are attached to 
alternatives (Maruyama, 1980). Watson et al. (1993) demonstrate that multinational groups 
outperform homogenous groups in the range of perspectives and alternatives generated. Since 
strategic decision-making is a task characterized by high complexity, uncertainty and lack of 
routines, nationality diversity is likely to improve the comprehensiveness and quality of 
strategic decisions, which in turn influence firm performance.  
Here, our concept of nationality is the country nationality of the asset manager Chief 
Investment Officer (CIO) engaged to manage the asset collected in each investment line. The 
aim of this paper is to test the following hypothesis: 
H: Asset manager nationality affects Italian occupational pension fund performance. 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1 The Sample 
The sample used in this paper was created from the list of occupational pension funds 
identified and recognized by the Pension Funds Supervision Commission (COVIP) (a total of 
35) at the end of 2007, the year of the introduction of Italian pension reform (Legislative 
Decree 252/2005) until the end of 2011
1
. The occupational pension funds no longer operating 
at the end of 2011 (two) were eliminated.  For each occupational pension fund, we analyzed 
Business and Economic Research 
ISSN 2162-4860 
2016, Vol. 6, No. 2 
www.macrothink.org/ber 181 
the balance sheets from the years 2007–2011 in order to gather information on: a) the number 
and the types of investment lines offered in each fund; b) the number of subscribers enrolled 
and the assets under management for each investment line at year-end; c) the risk level for 
each investment line; d) the overall benchmark for each investment line and the benchmark 
assigned to each asset manager in the case of multiple-managers; e) the number of asset 
managers engaged per investment line; f) the nationality of each asset manager and the nature 
of the mandate (single or multiple); g) the percentage of the asset under management 
assigned to each manager according to nationality and h) the annual return for each 
investment line.  
After this selection, of the original 33 Italian occupational pension funds our final sample 
comprised 28 occupational pension funds. Table 1 describes the sample used in this survey, 
distinguishing between different investment line risks and divided between single- and 
multiple-managers. 
Table 1. Sample descriptive statistics (N=437, years 2007-2011). 
Guaranteed Investment line  Mean Min Max Observations 
Single-manager Overall 
Between 
Within 
0.9496 0 
0 
0.3496 
1 
1 
1.3496 
N=139 
n=29 
T-bar= 4.79 
Multiple-managers Overall 
Between 
Within 
0.0504 0 
0 
-0.3496 
1 
1 
0.6504 
Very low investment line      
Single-manager Overall 
Between 
Within 
0.67 0 
0 
-0.08 
1 
1 
1.06 
N=24 
n=6 
T-bar= 4 
Multiple-managers Overall 
Between 
Within 
0.33 0 
0 
-0.07 
1 
1 
1.08 
Low risk line      
Single-manager Overall 
Between 
Within 
0.3929 0 
0 
-0.0071 
1 
1 
1.1928 
N=56 
n=12 
T-bar= 4.67 
Multiple-managers Overall 
Between 
Within 
0.6071 0 
0 
-0.1928 
1 
1 
1.007 
Balanced investment line      
Single-manager Overall 
Between 
Within 
0.05 0 
0 
-0.15 
1 
1 
0.85 
N=120 
n=24 
T-bar=5 Multiple-managers Overall 
Between 
0.95 0 
0 
1 
1 
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Within 0.15 1.15 
Growth investment line      
Single-manager Overall 
Between 
Within 
0.6428 0 
0 
-0.1571 
1 
1 
1.1429 
N=98 
n=22 
T-bar=4.45 
Multiple-managers Overall 
Between 
Within 
0.3572 0 
0 
-0.1428 
1 
1 
1.1571 
Source: Author‟s calculation 
Table 1 shows that a single-manager is engaged mainly to manage guaranteed, very low risk 
and growth investment lines, while multiple-managers are largely engaged in the case of low 
risk and balanced investment lines. According to the asset manager distribution highlighted in 
Table 1, it is not possible to compare single- and multiple-managers‟ activity because they are 
concentrated in different risk investment lines. For this reason in our analysis we consider 
two sub-samples related to single- and multiple-managers. 
3.2 Methodology 
Many studies use the Fama and French (1993) methodology to explain mutual fund (or more 
rarely, pension fund) performance. The purpose of this paper is not to repeat this kind of 
analysis for Italian occupational pension funds.  
3.2.1 Single-manager 
Table 2 presents the main descriptive statistics of the variables used in the survey with 
reference to single-managers, while the matrix correlation is shown in Table 3. 
Table 2. Single-manager descriptive statistics (N=243, years 2007-2011). 
Variable Mean Std. Dv. Min  Max 
Dependent Variable: Rp     
Overall 
Between 
Within 
0.0211 0.0644 
0.0116 
0.0635 
-0.2803 0.2052 
     
Independent Variables     
Rb 
Between 
Within 
0.02400 0.0659 
0.0139 
0.0647 
-0.2821 0.2084 
l_size 
Between 
Within 
16.7093 1.5568 
1.3562 
0.9812 
10.0234 21.7671 
Alpha_IT 
Between 
Within 
-0.1896 1.5939 
0.7061 
1.4430 
-5.7900 6.1100 
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Alpha_CH 
Between 
Within 
0.0087 1.9282 
0.6017 
0.1817 
-0.9399 2.27 
Alpha_D 
Between 
Within 
-0.0434 0.4554 
0.2362 
0.3824 
-4.9600 2.3300 
Alpha_FR 
Between 
Within 
-0.0152 0.2518 
0.1677 
0.1788 
-1.76 2.25 
Alpha_NL 
Between 
Within 
0 0 
0 
0 
0 0 
Alpha_UK 
Between 
Within 
-0.0304 0.2751 
0.1415 
0.2295 
-2.0500 0.7800 
Alpha_USA 
Between 
Within 
-0.0210 0.2548 
0.3361 
0.1104 
-3.7200 0 
R1 
Between 
Within 
0.5523  0 1 
R2 
Between 
Within 
0.0669  0 1 
R3 
Between 
Within 
0.0920  0 1 
R4 
Between 
Within 
0.02510  0 1 
R5 
Between 
Within 
0.2636  0 1 
Source: Author‟s calculation 
Table 3. Single-manager matrix correlation. 
 Rp Rb l_size Alpha_IT Alpha_CH Alpha_D Alpha_FR Alpha_UK Alpha_USA 
Rp 1         
Rb 0.9656 1        
l_size 0.0196 0.0526 1       
Alpha_IT 0.0391 -0.2018 -0.1357 1      
Alpha_CH 0.1699 0.1346 -0.0204 0.0055 1     
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Alpha_ D 0.0107 -0.0550 -0.0233 -0.0155 0.0044 1    
Alpha_FR -0.0529 -0.0873 -0.0071 -0.0073 0.0028 -0.0058 1   
Alpha_UK -0.0141 -0.0511 0.0644 -0.0133 0.0051 -0.0107 -0.0068 1  
Apha_USA -0.0240 -0.0587 -0.0237 -0.0100 0.0038 -0.0080 -0.0050 -0.0092 1 
Source: Author‟s calculation 
Table 2 shows that Dutch asset managers are not engaged as single-managers, while Italian 
asset managers are mainly engaged as single-managers. Moreover, a single-manager is 
predominant in the case of guaranteed lines. Table 3 highlights the fact that benchmark return 
has a high and positive correlation with the investment line performance; for this reason we 
expected a significant and positive correlation in the regression analysis.  
In order to test the impact of nationality of asset managers on Italian occupational pension 
funds, for each investment line (from Risk1 to Risk5; Risk1 identifies the guaranteed line, 
Risk2 is the very low risk investment line, Risk3 is the low-risk investment line, Risk4 is the 
balanced-risk investment line, Risk5 is the high-level risk investment line), the panel 
regression analysis is as follows: 
   (1) 
where a is the constant, Rp is the performance at the year-end of each investment line, Rb is 
the annual performance benchmark per investment line, l_size is the logarithm of the asset 
under management (multiplied by 1,000,000) collected per each investment line at year-end, 
Alpha_AM is the alpha generated alternatively by Italian asset managers, Swiss asset 
managers, German asset managers, French asset managers, British asset managers, U.S. asset 
managers for each investment line, and Ti are time dummies (2008-2011).  
3.2.2 Multiple-managers 
Table 4 presents the main descriptive statistics of the variables used in the survey with 
reference to multiple-managers, while the matrix correlation is shown in Table 5. 
Table 4. Multiple-managers: descriptive statistics (N=194, years 2007-2011). 
Variable Mean Std. Dv. Min  Max 
Dependent Variable: Rp     
Overall 
Between 
Within 
0.0135 0.0710 
0.0130 
0.0701 
-0.2206 0.1645 
Independent Variables     
Rb 
Between 
Within 
0.0173 0.0761 
0.0139 
0.0740 
-0.2524 0.2158 
l_size 
Between 
18.7352 1.5658 
1.6781 
14.0473 21.9876 
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Within 0.4234 
N_Managers  
Between 
Within 
3.3080 1.2709 
1.1748 
0.4927 
2 6 
Alpha_IT 
Between 
Within 
-0.2073 1.8420 
0.9302 
1.6091 
-16.7400 4.7500 
Alpha_CH 
Between 
Within 
-0.0078 0.3518 
0.0635 
0.3462 
-1.9 3 
Alpha_D 
Between 
Within 
-0.0820 0.5124 
0.2087 
0.4634 
-4.67 1.62 
Alpha_FR 
Between 
Within 
-0.01292 1.3581 
0.6883 
1.1663 
-16.34 4 
Alpha_NL 
Between 
Within 
0.06454 0.4668 
0.2792 
0.3680 
-1.9 4.39 
Alpha_UK 
Between 
Within 
0.0273 0.1998 
0.1619 
0.1035 
-0.42 2.05 
Alpha_USA 
Between 
Within 
0.0032 0.4705 
0.2111 
0.4187 
-6 1.29 
R1 
Between 
Within 
0.0353  0 1 
R2 
Between 
Within 
0.0404  0 1 
R3 
Between 
Within 
0.1717  0 1 
R4 
Between 
Within 
0.5758  0 1 
R5 
Between 
Within 
0.1768  0 1 
Source: Author‟s calculation 
Table 5. Multiple-managers: matrix correlation. 
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Rp 1           
Rb 0.9605 1          
l_size 0.1272 0.0627 1         
N_Managers 0.0729 0.0703 0.4046 1        
Alpha_IT -0.0016 -0.0049 -0.1340 -0.3616 1       
Alpha_CH 0.0061 -0.0071 -0.1056 -0.0300 -0.2868 1      
Alpha_ D 0.0761 0.0809 0.1394 0.1366 -0.3329 -0.0921 1     
Alpha_FR 0.0458 0.0294 0.2285 0.1698 -0.3502 0.1036 0.0349 1    
Alpha_NL -0.0846 -0.1162 0.0958 0.0558 -0.1736 -0.1439 0.0164 0.1065 1   
Alpha_UK 0.1201 0.1624 -0.0932 0.3475 -0.2349 -0.0379 -0.0346 0.0038 -0.1376 1  
Alpha_USA -0.0859 -0.0668 -0.1013 -0.1016 -0.3065 -0.1152 0.1021 -0.0992 -0.0668 -0.0905 1 
Source: Author‟s calculation 
Table 4 shows three interesting items: first, the number of asset managers ranges from 2 
(minimum) to 6 (maximum); second, the investment lines managed by multiple-managers are 
mainly in the balanced risk category, and third, Dutch, British and U.S. asset managers on 
average achieve positive alpha.  Table 5 highlights that the benchmark return has a high and 
positive correlation with the investment line performance; for this reason we expected a 
significant and positive correlation in the regression analysis.  
In order to test the impact of the nationality of asset managers on Italian occupational pension 
funds, for each investment line (running from Risk1 to Risk5: Risk1 identifies the guaranteed 
line, Risk2 is the very low risk investment line, Risk3 is the low-risk investment line, Risk4 is 
the balanced-risk investment line, Risk5 is the high-level risk investment line), the panel 
regression analysis is as follows: 
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                         (2) 
where a is the constant, Rp is the performance at the year-end of each investment line, Rb is 
the annual benchmark performance per investment line, l_size is the logarithm of the asset 
under management (multiplied by 1,000,000) collected per each investment line at year-end, 
N_Managers is the number of asset managers engaged per investment line, Alpha_IT is the 
alpha generated by Italian asset managers for each investment line, Alpha_CH is the alpha 
generated by Swiss asset managers for each investment line, Alpha_D is the alpha of German 
asset managers for each investment line, Alpha_FR is the alpha created by French asset 
managers for each investment line, Alpha_NL is the alpha of Dutch asset managers for each 
investment line, Alpha_UK is the alpha generated by British asset managers for each 
investment line, Apha_USA is the alpha of U.S. asset managers for each investment line, and 
Ti are time dummies (2008-2011).  
4. Main Results 
4.1 Single-manager 
Table 6 presents the results obtained from equation (1). The Hausman test indicates consistent 
random effect results, and so them only are shown in this paper. The Single-manger is not 
engaged for the balanced investment line, and so is not presented in Table 6. As expected, 
Table 6 shows that the benchmark has a positive and significant impact on the investment line 
return managed by single-manager. In particular, Italian and British asset managers are 
engaged as single-managers to manage the guaranteed line. The former has a positive and 
significant impact on the performance achieved while the second has no impact on it. With 
reference to this specific investment line, Table 6 shows that time dummies are significant. 
2008 and 2009, the years of the economic crisis that afflicted all countries after the Lehman 
Brothers incident, have a positive impact on the guaranteed line performance in the case of 
both Italian and UK asset managers. This is probably due to the fact that the assets collected 
in this investment line are invested almost totally in government securities. When the crisis 
extended to the debts of sovereign states, including Italy, in 2010, British asset managers 
probably experienced greater difficulty in managing an investment line investing mainly in 
Italian government securities, so this year has a negative impact on the performance achieved. 
Despite this, a British manager generates a positive impact in terms of guaranteed line 
performance achieved.   
Considering the very-low risk investment line, when the asset manager is German, the 
benchmark and the German asset manager‟s ability positively and significantly affect the 
line‟s performance. In the case of Italian and French asset managers, neither their ability nor 
the benchmark impacted on the performance achieved.    
Italian, Swiss and British asset managers are engaged as single-managers for the low-risk 
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investment line, and according to Table 6 each of them positively and significantly 
contributes to the performance achieved by this investment line. The benchmark also has a 
positive and significant impact on it.  
With reference to the higher risk investment line, its performance is positively and 
significantly affected by the benchmark and by the management ability of Italian and French 
asset managers. The other asset managers engaged in this investment line (Swiss, German 
and US) have no impact on it.  
Investment line size, in the case of the very-low risk investment line, makes a positive and 
significant contribution to its performance, while in the case of the very-low risk and 
high-risk lines it has a negative impact on it.    
Bearing these results in mind, with reference to a single-manager, our hypothesis is 
confirmed: asset manager nationality influences Italian occupational pension fund 
performance.  
Table 6 Single-manager regression results. 
 
4.2 Multiple-managers 
The results obtained by equation (2), related to multiple-managers, are presented in Table 7. 
The Hausman test indicates consistent random effect results, and so them only are shown in 
this paper. Multiple-managers are engaged to manage the low-risk, the balanced and the 
high-risk investment lines.  
Table 7. Multiple-managers: regression results. 
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Investment line Low-risk Balanced High-risk 
Rb 1.038*** 0.931*** 0.873*** 
 (0.0700) (0.0417) (0.133) 
l_size -0.00133 0.00118 -0.00283 
 (0.000987) (0.00103) (0.00247) 
N_Managers 0.000363 -0.00103 -0.00241 
 (0.00153) (0.000781) (0.00300) 
Alpha_IT 0.0141*** 0.00932*** 0.00952*** 
 (0.00125) (0.000968) (0.00128) 
Alpha_CH 0.0530 0.0155** 0.0177 
 (0.0481) (0.00715) (0.0194) 
Alpha_D -0.00469 -0.0122 0.0131 
 (0.0292) (0.0203) (0.0132) 
Alpha_FR 0.00939 0.00441* 0.00453 
 (0.00828) (0.00247) (0.00697) 
Alpha_NL 0.00468 -0.0336 -0.000755 
 (0.00411) (0.0282) (0.0125) 
Alpha_UK 0.107 -0.0109 2.559 
 (0.0884) (0.0148) (4.841) 
Alpha_USA -0.106*** 0.00967 0.0186** 
 (0.0280) (0.0191) (0.00788) 
t2 0.00315 -0.00426 -0.0131 
 (0.00692) (0.00500) (0.0280) 
t3 -0.00277 0.00169 0.000556 
 (0.00674) (0.00484) (0.0216) 
t4 -0.000611 0.00132 -0.00782 
 (0.00402) (0.00306) (0.0124) 
t5 0.00169 -0.00510* -0.00434 
 (0.00418) (0.00302) (0.0130) 
Constant 0.0490 -0.0396 0.111 
 (0.0333) (0.0372) (0.0888) 
Observations 
Number of id 
R-squared 
34 
8 
0.99 
114 
23 
0.98 
34 
9 
0.98 
Source: Author‟s calculation 
Table 7 shows that the number of asset managers has no impact on the performance achieved. 
Italian asset managers have a positive and significant impact on each examined investment 
line‟s performance, while French and Swiss asset managers positively and significantly 
contribute in the case of a balanced-risk investment line. German, UK and Dutch asset 
managers have no impact on the performance of the investment line in which they are 
engaged as multiple-managers.  
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With reference to the low-risk investment line, a US asset manager has a negative and 
significant impact on its performance, while he or she positively and significantly affects the 
results of the high-risk investment line when coacting.  
Size has no impact on investment line performance in the case of multiple-managers.   
4. Conclusions 
The aim of this paper is to verify whether asset manager nationality impacts on Italian 
occupational pension fund performance. The database used in this paper is a unique dataset 
with reference to the specific Italian pension fund scheme. The analysis divides the sample in 
two sub-samples: one comprising Italian occupational pension funds managed by 
single-managers and the other managed by coacting multiple-managers.  
The results obtained highlight several considerations. First, the benchmark (and its 
performance) affected the results achieved in almost all the investment lines examined, hence 
revealing the fact that asset managers tend to mirror the benchmark. Second, from an overall 
point of view, some asset managers contribute to the performance achieved while others 
never contribute to it. For instance, Dutch asset managers, who are not engaged as 
single-managers, do not contribute to investment line performance even if they are engaged 
as multiple-managers. Italian asset managers, on the contrary, have a positive impact on the 
performance of the investment lines in which they are engaged either as single- or 
multiple-managers. This is a good result but in part only confirms expectations, taking into 
consideration the fact that Italian occupational pension funds invest mainly in Italian asset 
classes. For this reason, a positive contribution to performance due to foreign asset managers 
such as German, Swiss, French and British single-managers and Swiss, French and US 
multiple-managers should be further emphasized.  Especially in the case of increasing 
investment line risk, U.S. and British asset managers express their capabilities. 
Third, with reference to foreign asset managers, our analysis traces different asset manager 
capabilities in generating performance when the investment line risk increases or decreases. 
For example, only Italian asset managers seem to be able to contribute to guaranteed line 
performance, while a German asset manager is better in the case of very low risk. In the case 
of a high-risk investment line, Italian and French asset managers seems to be better as 
single-managers. Recalling our research hypothesis (Asset manager nationality affects 
occupational pension fund performance), we can say it is confirmed.   
To conclude, our analysis generates two questions: 1) as the number of asset managers 
engaged has no impact on Italian occupational pension fund performance, is it necessary to 
maintain the multiple-manager approach? 2) bearing in mind the results obtained in this paper, 
could it be helpful to select asset managers on the basis of their nationality, discarding those 
who do not generate a positive impact in terms of performance? These could be topics for 
further research. 
1 The data analysis deliberately considers the period 2007-2011 for some important reasons.  
After the year 2011, many Italian occupational pension funds have closed some investment 
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lines which had a limited number of members and in other cases have been merged with other 
types of investment lines. Despite this, from reading the annual reports, the asset manager 
nationality has not changed over the years. Therefore, take into account a longer period of 
analysis would lead to two consequences: 
a) a reduction in the number of observations; b) a possible dilution of the performance caused 
by mergers between investment lines with different initially (2007) risk profiles.  
For this reason we decided to consider the period 2007-2011 in the aim of maintain the 
greater informativeness and management continuity. 
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Appendix - Robustness check 
According to the matrix correlation shown in Tables III and V, the benchmark return has a 
strong impact on the Italian occupational pension funds examined in this survey. This 
situation is confirmed in the regression analysis presented in Tables VI and VII. For this 
reason, in this section, we would like to check the obtained results considering single- and 
multiple-managers separately but considering as a dependent variable the excess return (ER) 
of each investment line calculated comparing the investment line performance (Rp)and the 
benchmark assigned return (Rb) at the year-end.  
Single-manager 
In order to test the impact of the nationality of asset managers on Italian occupational pension 
funds, for each investment line (going from Risk1 to Risk5: Risk1 identifies the guaranteed 
line, Risk2 is the very low risk investment line, Risk3 is the low-risk investment line, Risk4 is 
the balanced-risk investment line, Risk5 is the high-level risk investment line), the panel 
regression analysis is as follows: 
               (3) 
where a is the constant, ER is the excess return comparing the performance of each 
investment line and the benchmark assigned at the year-end, l_size is the logarithm of the 
asset under management (multiplied by 1,000,000) collected per each investment line at 
year-end, Alpha_IT is the alpha generated by Italian asset manager/s for each investment line, 
Alpha_CH is the alpha generated by Swiss asset managers for each investment line, Alpha_D 
is the alpha of German asset managers for each investment line, Alpha_FR is the alpha 
created by French asset managers for each investment line, Alpha_UK is the alpha generated 
by British asset managers for each investment line, Apha_USA is the alpha of U.S. asset 
managers for each investment line, and T2, T3, T4, T5 are time dummies (2008-2011). Table 
8 shows Regression (3) results. 
Table 8. Single-manager: regression results 
 Guaranteed line Very-low risk line Low-risk line High-risk 
l_size -0.00220 0.0003 0.00159 -0.000340 
 (0.00135) (0.000109) (0.00167) (0.00166) 
Alpha_IT 0.00869*** 0.0102*** 0.00642*** 0.00837*** 
 (0.00115) (0.000218) (0.00179) (0.00110) 
Alpha_CH 0 0 0.0125*** 0.00323 
 (0) (0) (0.00308) (0.00696) 
Alpha_D 0 0.0100*** 0 0.00897 
 (0) (9.33e-05) (0) (0.00696) 
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Alpha_FR 0 0.0102*** 0 0.00941** 
 (0) (0.000719) (0) (0.00435) 
Alpha_NL 0 0 0 0 
 (0) (0) (0) (0) 
Alpha_UK 0.0101 0 0.00768*** 0 
 (0.00710) (0) (0.00242) (0) 
Alpha_USA 0 0 0 0.00920** 
 (0) (0) (0) (0.00413) 
t2 -0.0110* -0.000315 0.00519 0.0175*** 
 (0.00635) (0.000347) (0.00332) (0.00664) 
t3 -0.0106 -0.000561 -0.000290 -0.00353 
 (0.00691) (0.000443) (0.00375) (0.00673) 
t4 -0.00975 -0.000463 0.00318 0.00465 
 (0.00710) (0.000373) (0.00364) (0.00671) 
t5 -0.00731 -0.000477 0.00568 0.00860 
 (0.00705) (0.000551) (0.00386) (0.00666) 
Constant 0.0873* -0.000646 -0.0613 0.00398 
 (0.0451) (0.00381) (0.0606) (0.0577) 
Observations 
 
Number of id 
 
R-squared 
129 
 
28 
 
 
0.39 
16 
 
5 
 
 
0.99 
22 
 
6 
 
 
0.83 
63 
 
15 
 
 
0.67 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
(Standard errors in parentheses) 
Source: data elaborated by the author 
Multiple-managers 
In order to test the impact of the nationality of asset managers on Italian occupational pension 
funds, for each investment line (going from Risk1 to Risk5: Risk1 identifies the guaranteed 
line, Risk2 is the very low risk investment line, Risk3 is the low-risk investment line, Risk4 is 
the balanced-risk investment line, Risk5 is the high-level risk investment line), the panel 
regression analysis is as follows: 
                      (4) 
where a is the constant, ER is the excess return comparing each investment line performance 
and the benchmark assigned at the year-end, l_size is the logarithm of the asset under 
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management (multiplied by 1,000,000) collected per each investment line at year-end, the 
N_Managers is the number of asset managers engaged per investment line, Alpha_IT is the 
alpha generated by Italian asset manager/s for each investment line, Alpha_CH is the alpha 
generated by Swiss asset managers for each investment line, Alpha_D is the alpha of German 
asset managers for each investment line, Alpha_FR is the alpha created by French asset 
managers for each investment line, Alpha_NL is the alpha of Dutch asset managers for each 
investment line, Alpha_UK is the alpha generated by British asset managers for each 
investment line, Apha_USA is the alpha of U.S. asset managers for each investment line, and 
T2, T3, T4, T5 are time dummies (2008-2011). Table 9 shows Regression (4) results. 
Table 9. Multiple-manager: regression results 
 Low-risk Balanced High-risk 
l_size -0.00305** 0.000737 -0.00343 
 (0.00145) (0.00114) (0.00250) 
N_Managers 0.00165 -0.000811 -0.00235 
 (0.00229) (0.000867) (0.00304) 
Alpha_IT 0.0142*** 0.00795*** 0.00970*** 
 (0.00187) (0.00107) (0.00123) 
Alpha_CH 0.0835 0.00947 0.0263 
 (0.0714) (0.00788) (0.0195) 
Alpha_D -0.0400 -0.0140 0.00332 
 (0.0428) (0.0227) (0.0132) 
Alpha_FR -0.000896 0.00519* 0.00884 
 (0.0122) (0.00276) (0.00707) 
Alpha_NL 0.00776 -0.0533* -0.00460 
 (0.00610) (0.0314) (0.0122) 
Alpha_UK 0.0795 -0.0111 4.354 
 (0.132) (0.0165) (4.878) 
Alpha_USA -0.117*** 0.00771 0.0199** 
 (0.0420) (0.0209) (0.00795) 
t2 -0.00655 0.00302 0.0119 
 (0.00636) (0.00312) (0.0112) 
t3 -0.00828 -0.00935*** -0.0245** 
 (0.00622) (0.00321) (0.0113) 
t4 -0.00628 -0.000471 -0.0116 
 (0.00590) (0.00322) (0.0113) 
t5 -0.00955 -0.00517 -0.0122 
 (0.00606) (0.00330) (0.0118) 
Constant 0.115** -0.0248 0.132 
 (0.0493) (0.0413) (0.0900) 
Business and Economic Research 
ISSN 2162-4860 
2016, Vol. 6, No. 2 
www.macrothink.org/ber 196 
Observations 
 
Number of id 
 
R-squared 
34 
 
8 
 
0.92 
114 
 
23 
 
0.47 
34 
 
9 
 
0.85 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
(Standard errors in parentheses) 
Source: data elaborated by the author 
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